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Human development is a transformational project.1 It is about changing
people’s lives for the better. This is so obvious that one might suppose it
wouldn’t need saying. And yet the transformative nature of development has
controversial implications that are rarely explicitly considered. Do the people
concerned agree that their lives are deficient? Do they freely consent to the
process of development, or is it something that is done to them? Are they
better off after development than they were before, or merely changed?
Intuitively, something is amiss if we cannot give affirmative answers to these
questions. Should we even call it development? This paper is concerned with
elucidating the ethical implications and constraints that follow from examining
the idea of development as transformation. These issues have, we believe, been
relatively neglected in the development literature, including that of the human
development approach.
Other ‘conventional’ accounts of development may fudge the issue of
transformation by speaking only of enhancing people’s capacities to live well,
for example in terms of meeting people’s existing basic needs, or increasing
their ability to satisfy their existing wants (perhaps by increasing their ‘budget’
through economic development). In such accounts, people’s values are
understood as essentially passive and static with respect to the development
process itself, and the challenge of development is merely to help them to better
live the lives they now have. In contrast, the human development approach has
directly transformational goals: to enhance people’s freedom to live the kinds
of lives they have reason to value. Not only is its focus on people rather than
the means of development, but it actively engages those concerned in two ways
in an approach to development understood “as a participatory and dynamic
process” (UNDP 1990, 11). Its goal is that people become more truly the authors
of their own lives, and it considers this active authorship also the means by
which development should be achieved (cf. Sen 1999a, 18–9). The human
development approach thus has no choice but to face up to the conceptual and
ethical implications of personal transformation.
The general risk in neglecting the ethics of transformation is paternalism:
directly substituting one’s own values for those one is trying to help. That is
inconsistent with the centrality of self-authorship to the human development
approach. Nevertheless, paternalism is an ever present danger in work on
development and one which can creep in all too easily in the company of good
intentions. This paper seeks to make three distinct contributions to preventing
paternalism in development, one theoretical and two practical.
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First, although the capability approach understands persons as agents, it
represents people in terms of their location in the capability space (that is, in
terms of the set of functioning n-tuples to which they have effective access).
This way of representing persons can be problematic to the extent that it
suggests a thin, static, and passive sense of personal identity that distorts
evaluation or policy. We address this by introducing the concept of a ‘personal
identity capability’, a conception of personal autonomy analyzed as a capability.
Thus theorized, persons are understood not only in the general, somewhat
diffuse sense of the agent as a “doer and a judge” (Sen 1985, 208), but as able
to take up a reflective stance towards themselves as a person persisting and yet
developing over time, and to make plans and choices accordingly.
Second, we argue that this theoretical representation provides a new goal
and side-constraint for development practice. The protection and enhancement
of individuals’ personal identity capability should be recognised as an
important goal in its own right. And it should also be recognised as a
requirement for any policy to count as human development, rather than as
something else. Applying this is not straightforward, however, and this leads us
to make two specific proposals for development practice. We first introduce the
principle of Free Prior Informed Consent as a central ethical concept for
organizing and guiding ethical reflection in the practice of development.
Second, we argue that Democratic Development, in which the people concerned
participate deliberatively in deciding what kind of development programmes
they want, and thus the kind of transformations that will take place, is not only
a generally good thing among others. Like free prior informed consent it should
be understood as a necessary condition for any project claiming to be part of
the human development approach.
In the following section we contrast the conventional development and
human development approaches to demonstrate the directly transformative
aspirations of the latter. Section II analyses how neglect of the transformational
character of development can lead to methodological and ethical problems.
Section III introduces the concept of a personal identity capability, and argues
that it offers a way of overcoming these problems. Section IV introduces the
principle of informed consent and its place in development practice. Section V
analyses the necessary relationship between democracy and human
development.
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I. Development as Transformation
Sen has distinguished the capability approach to development from its
alternatives in terms of their respective focuses. He claims that conventional
approaches all focus, in one way or another, on providing the means and
circumstances for a better life (what we term ‘capacity building’). In practice
this has meant the ‘fetishisation’ of indirectly relevant features, such as
economic growth, at the expense of what is of direct relevance – the ability of
individuals to live lives they have reason to value. The capability approach
addresses this tendency by subsuming the logistical concerns of its alternatives
within an account of development that puts people at the centre (UNDP 1990,
chap. 1). Nevertheless, a focus on the means of development has one apparent
advantage: it allows an evasion of explicit consideration of important ethical
concerns about individual transformation. In contrast, the capability approach
must address these concerns directly.
Conventional ‘capacity building’ accounts of development policy tend to
represent, or implicitly assume a view of, the individual as having an
unchanging personal identity with respect to the development process. This
does not mean that development policies aren’t expected or even intended to
change people’s choice behaviour. For example, the recent ‘institutional turn’ in
development economics has brought attention to problematic social norms like
corruption that reduce and distort economic growth, while the human capital
approach emphasises how investing in children’s education and health can pay
off, both for them and for society as a whole. Development policies directed at
these goals (reducing corruption, increasing schooling) are generally oriented to
institutional reforms and incentives; that is to changing the constraints that
individuals face (principally, budgetary and informational), but not, directly, to
transforming their values or preferences.2 For instance, Kaushik Basu (as Chief
Economic Adviser to the Government of India) proposed making it legal to pay
harassment bribes, but not to receive them (Basu 2011);3 evidence from
randomised controlled trials has been used to suggest small adjustments to the
costs and benefits of schooling to make it more attractive to parents, such as
providing free school uniforms and free lunches (see e.g. Banerjee and Duflo
2011). Thus, in both cases, the objective seems to be not the transformation of
individual values, but the promotion of certain behavioural patterns conducive
to improving the functioning of the economy and reducing material poverty.
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A similar point can be made about the Basic Needs Approach to
development, which flourished briefly from the mid-1970s to early 1980s in
response to the perceived failings of GDP growth-based approaches to
development and income based views of poverty, before being largely
subsumed within the human development approach. Although in theory the
Basic Needs Approach was explicitly concerned with democratic participation
as well as with meeting minimum requirements for goods and services like
food, shelter, sanitation and education, in practice democratic participation was
often considered separately if at all.4 Thus, in practice, the Basic Needs
Approach was mainly a technocratic enterprise concerned with the logistics of
serving externally identified universal needs. Hence also its general lack of
engagement with the people concerned in determining what their needs were which seems to have been perceived as patronising and harmed its reception in
poor countries (Stewart 2007, 15). The same neglect of democratic deliberation
can be seen in contemporary examples of Basic Needs style development
policies, such as the Millennium Development Goals project.
Thus, what we have termed ‘capacity building’ approaches to development
do not conceive the goal or processes of development to be transformational.
Instead they are focused on and justified by their concern with increasing
people’s capacity to live the lives they already have (whether that is understood
in terms of meeting their basic needs as humans or their personal consumption
preferences5). Taking this perspective evades having to address the ethical
controversies involved in the idea of development as transformation. But of
course, capacity building development still transforms people. It just does so
indirectly and without evaluation, direction, or accountability. As Denis Goulet,
a pioneer of development ethics, noted,
The experience which villagers in traditional societies have of what
Westerners call technical or economic progress is that the values which
matter most to them – religious institutions, local practices, and extended
family solidarity networks – fall apart under the impact of technology, the
monetization of the economy, and the specialization of tasks. (Goulet 1992,
468)
In contrast, the human development approach is concerned not only with
making people’s lives go better, but also often directly with transforming them.
For example it sees education as important not merely for increasing economic
productivity via human capital formation, but also for directly transforming the
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lives of individuals (their capability for practical reasoning, their social
relations, the way that what they read may change them, and so on) and,
indirectly, for transforming society (by enhancing the inclusivity and quality of
public debate about social norms like family size) (Sen 1997). Making this
explicit directs our attention to how the capability approach should understand
and represent individuals – in terms of agency, not preference orderings or sets
of needs.
Unlike conventional development, then, the human development approach
deliberately sets out to transform people’s lives.6 The way the capability
approach represents individuals, in terms of their location in the capability
space, reflects this, since changing (improving) a person’s location is the goal of
development. Although the capability approach is often said to be concerned
with ‘expanding’ individuals’ capability sets (including by Sen (Sen 1989)) the
word ‘expansion’ may be misleading, since the capability approach is actually
concerned with enhancing the quality of options people have access to rather
than merely adding to them. This is an important distinction, because
development doesn’t simply provide people with additional options on top of
what they already had, such as for industrial sector formal employment as well
as their present self-employed craftwork. It is quite likely that the new options
will permanently displace old ones; for instance, a modern textile factory may
render traditional production methods such as Gandhi’s famous spinning wheel
uneconomical. This is an important reason to ensure that the new options
really are better than the old ones, i.e. that one has development rather than
merely change. ‘Capability enhancement’ may therefore be a better term for
what the capability approach is concerned to achieve.
Development understood as capability enhancement has transformative
implications for individuals’ lifestyles and values, and for societies in general.
Achievements of some functionings may lead to a re-evaluation and re-ranking
of other functionings. For example, increased individual mobility may change
how an individual - and society as a whole - values community and family life
and associated norms. Development will likely also change the definition of
particular capabilities, such as what constitutes adequate health-care or literacy
(often making their requirements more substantial). To give a more concrete
example, women’s literacy is strongly associated with increased empowerment
and substantial effects on social norms around family life, including lower
fertility and a more equal intra-family distribution of resources between males
and females (Alkire 2005, 255–271; 294–6; Sen 1999a, 198–9). Altogether then,
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the capability approach to development expects (and promotes) multiple
transformations in individuals’ and society’s self-understanding, values, and
ways of life: some intended, others unintended but foreseeable, and yet others
that are more or less unknowable.
The value of a person’s capability set is understood in terms of her effective
access to functioning combinations she has reason to value. Thus, an
individual’s capability depends not only on her commodity entitlements and
ability to convert them into functionings (the logistical aspect of the capability
approach), but also on her reasoned valuation.7 What kinds of life an individual
has reason to value will depend on her concerns and interests, which may be
quite different from other people’s, though still influenced by local social
norms and arrangements. The important point to note is that this valuation is
dynamic and endogenous to the development process itself. That is, as part of
the development process individuals are expected to change their views both
about which specific capabilities matter and about what constitutes a good life.
How can people be understood as changing in this way while remaining the
same people? The capability approach is evolutionary in that having any
particular set of capabilities opens the door to acquiring additional capabilities.
For example, when a person achieves a certain level of education, they then
have opportunities for employment they previously did not have. Thus the
person with basic literacy in her native language who exercises her capability
for further education and chooses to pursue an advanced degree in, say,
ancient Sanskrit literature. Pursuing this option will shape her future
capabilities for work and leisure, while the commitment it requires may also
reduce her access to other, plausibly valuable, kinds of life and specific
capabilities that were originally open to her (cf Livet 2006). That is, individuals
are understood as autonomous agents who are engaged with development in a
co-evolutionary way.
There is no claim here, as there is implicitly in the capacity building
approaches, that development is something that happens apart from
individuals and their values. Unlike those accounts, the capability approach
cannot avoid directly addressing the ethical challenges involved in combining a
commitment to autonomous agency with the fact of transformative
development. The first part of addressing that challenge is to give a clearer
account of agent autonomy. How should the capability approach conceptualize
the ability of people to be the author of their own lives, to change while
remaining the same person?
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II. Is Development Good for the Individuals Concerned? The Autonomy
Critique
Writing with Martha Nussbaum, Amartya Sen identifies two ways in which
development can undermine values (Nussbaum and Sen 1989). First there is
what he calls ‘object failure’: when structural changes make traditionally valued
goods or ways of life more expensive or difficult to obtain. For example,
industrialization may increase the relative costs of labour intensive goods such
as religious rituals or traditional dress, or land reform may make many of the
traditional ways of life of nomadic peoples impossible. This may be
experienced directly as a sense of loss.
Second, and analytically much more difficult, is what Sen calls ‘value
rejection’: when people turn against their old values. For example, Buddhist
Japan was once religiously vegetarian but meat-eating became ubiquitous with
Japan’s rise to opulence; in Nepal the nuclear family household model is rapidly
displacing the extended family; and so on. Value rejection is methodologically
problematic because the frame of reference is itself changed, so whether the
change is a loss or a gain for those concerned cannot be read off from either
their antecedent or subsequent values. Indeed those values may be
incommensurable. It is ethically problematic, in terms of paternalism, because
it opens a space for a stable external ‘guardian’ authority to provide that
evaluation, an authority which, by definition, cannot be held accountable to
those concerned. When the same authority is in a position to deliberately
engineer that value rejection, all the elements are in place for paternalistic
development policy. Such paternalism is quite different from providing
information or arguments to persuade people to see that a different life would
be better or that certain of their values are invidious, such as excluding girl
children from education. Honest persuasion respects the autonomy of others,
their right to determine for themselves by their own reasoning what plans of
life follow from their conception of the good, including revisions to their values
in the light of new reasons, information, or options.
To identify more specifically how such paternalism may occur inadvertently
even in well-intended (beneficent) development projects we analyse it in terms
of the relationship between distinct intertemporal selves of the individuals
concerned. Our ‘autonomy critique’ here parallels a famous criticism of
utilitarianism for disregarding the proper boundaries between persons in its
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use of sum ranking (cf Rawls 1999, 24; Sen 1999a, 57). In that approach states
of the world are assessed only in terms of the total sum of welfare (however
defined), and possible states are ranked in terms of desirability from highest to
lowest scores. Snapshots of social welfare are taken at different times and if
aggregate welfare at time2 is higher than at time1, then welfare is considered
improved, even though the welfare of some particular individuals may have
declined quite severely. With sum-ranking, the welfare of some individuals may
be sacrificed for aggregate improvement, and this is part of what is generally
recognized to be ethically problematic about conventional economic
development programs. When a dam is built in a rural area to provide hydroelectric power for cities, it seems questionable to call the results for those
displaced from their homes, communities, and livelihoods ‘development’ since
their lives have been made worse (cf Roy 1999).
The autonomy critique raises similar questions about the sacrifice of some
individuals’ welfare for the sake of others, but focuses on respecting the
interests and values of inter-temporal selves within the life of the same
individual. Development is often understood and evaluated as an end-state: the
production of people with certain features, whether that be greater opulence or
an expanded capability set. For example literacy or morbidity statistics are
compared before and after a policy intervention. The problem is that this
comparative statics approach neglects the dimension of ‘becoming’, including
the processes by which an outcome is brought about and whether these respect
the personal autonomy of those concerned.8 Extending the evaluation of
individual advantage to the capability space (i.e. to incorporate non-pecuniary
‘beings and doings’ such as empowerment and literacy) enriches the
comparative statics analysis but does not address this dimension of becoming.
The ethical force of the autonomy critique is to highlight the possibly
illegitimate conflation of a person’s interests and values at different points in
time. It is motivated by a concern to justify and assess development with
proper regard to each person as a “doer and a judge” before as well as after
they take part: no-one may be ‘forced to be free’, even for their own future
self’s sake. Even if everyone agrees that the ‘developed life’ is better - and even
if the ‘developed person’ herself endorses that ex post - one may still be uneasy
(cf Elster 1982). Firstly about the ethical justification for development if the ex
ante evaluation and concerns of that person are ignored or neglected. And
secondly about how one could assess the benefits or failings of these changes to
that person without considering the perspective she started from as well as
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where she ended up. There is a troubling circularity in assessing and justifying
development only or mainly from the single perspective of the conclusion.
A nice example of the problems this raises may be found in Sabina Alkire’s
pioneering work, in Valuing Freedoms (2005), on operationalizing the capability
approach by developing a capability based approach to the cost-benefit
evaluation of development projects. Alkire considers various exemplary NGO
projects in Pakistan, such as rose cultivation and goat raising, and shows how
the capability approach allows a wider range of significant impacts to be
included in evaluation than merely financial returns.
However in one Oxfam project, teaching adult female literacy, intertemporal problems appear (Alkire 2005, 255–271; 294–6). Alkire relates that the
program was promoted to women and taken up by them (with the permission
of their fathers/husbands) principally on the basis of claims that it would make
them more employable. Oxfam’s other aim of empowering the women was not
emphasized or even necessarily explained (though the choice of teaching
methods inspired by Paulo Freire suggests its centrality). There were however
no job opportunities for the graduates in the local area since no suitable
workplaces would employ women. Nevertheless Alkire says that the project
“had a fundamental and transformative impact on the women students” (Alkire
2005, 256): they reported increased empowerment and greatly valued this,
despite it not being one of their original reasons for participating.
What seems problematic about the literacy project is not the promotion of
specific transformative goals like empowerment, but its structure, which raises
questions about both legitimacy and assessment. One can question the
legitimacy of recruiting people to projects by appealing to interests which it is
known will not be fulfilled. Are those people being properly respected as
bearers of ends, or are they being used as means for the furtherance of the
interests of their future selves?9 Indeed, Alkire herself is somewhat troubled by
the possible duplicity or paternalism in how the literacy program was
presented as opposed to how it worked. She notes that her capability-based
approach to the evaluation of development projects “does not provide a way to
distinguish activities which use informed consent from activities in which
consent is built during the process” (Alkire 2005, 296).
One can also be sceptical of cost-benefit analysis in such cases since the
valuational frame of reference is not constant and it is unclear which set of
values truly represents the individual concerned. From the perspective of the
women at the point they agreed to take part in the literacy programme, it might
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be seen as a failure, or at least less of a success, because the main projected
benefit – jobs – did not appear, while the costs in terms of time were
significant. If those women had known that there would be no jobs at the end
of their education, they might not have agreed to participate (and their male
guardians might not have permitted them to). Yet from the perspective of the
women after completing the programme, an unanticipated result –
‘empowerment’ – was perceived as a central and significant benefit. These
women might have considered the classes well worthwhile even though things
turned out differently than they had been prepared for.
Putting the issue this way, in terms of present and future selves, may seem
abstruse, but it points directly to significant ethical issues. As Alkire notes,
focusing entirely on the ex post valuations of the women and ignoring their ex
ante valuations would allow all sorts of intensive political or religious
indoctrination programs to be justified in exactly the same way as beneficent
development programmes: the people who go through them would claim to
value what they have become.10 This suggests that ex post evaluation is very
susceptible to domination by external policy-makers, substituting their own
values for those of the people subject to their policies and then attempting to
bring people with those values about.
The autonomy critique questions the standard practice of assessing
development by comparing how well people are doing before and after an
intervention. Development work founded on the capability approach improves
on conventional evaluations by including non-pecuniary aspects of how well
individuals’ lives are going. Yet the autonomy critique notes the methodological
problem that an inconstant valuational framework poses to a capability-based
cost-benefit evaluation. It relates this issue to a second and more fundamental
problem in determining the legitimacy of the process of transformation. Only if
individuals are transformed in a way that respects their personal autonomy to
manage their lives over time can their ex post perspective be reliable in
informing us as to whether their lives have been genuinely improved rather
than merely changed. It seems to us that including the dimension of becoming
within capability analysis requires finding a way to talk about autonomy in
capability terms.
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III. The Capability for Personal Identity
In Development as Freedom, Amartya Sen contrasts the “agent-oriented”
capability approach with conventional approaches to development in terms of
treating those concerned as agents rather than merely as patients. As he puts it,
“With adequate social opportunities, individuals can effectively shape their own
destiny and help each other. They need not be seen primarily as passive
recipients of the benefits of cunning development programs” (Sen 1999a, 11).
Sen thus defines an agent “as someone who acts and brings about change, and
whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives”
(Sen 1999a, 19). This understanding derives from Sen’s distinction between
well-being and agency aspects of individual advantage, and his distinction
within the latter between agency achievement and agency freedom (Sen 1985;
Sen 1993).
Philosopher and development ethicist David Crocker devotes
considerable attention to Sen’s concept of agency freedom, emphasizing both
self-determination and critical scrutiny of one’s values and objectives (Crocker
2009, 153ff; Crocker and Robeyns 2009). We build on his thinking about
personal autonomy by linking it to Sen’s approach to social identity (Sen 1999b;
Sen 2006). Sen recognizes that people are members of a variety of social groups
and have many different social identities or affiliations, and says we reason
about what our relevant identities are and their relative importance (Sen 2006,
24). The self-determination and critical scrutiny of one’s values and objectives
that Crocker makes central to personal autonomy thus echoes Sen’s claims
about how we reflexively evaluate our social identities. The identity a person
has is not reducible to any single identity, or even collection of identities,
because a person is able to reflect on who she is as an autonomous—selfgoverning—individual apart from all her social identities when she explicitly
makes herself her object of concern (Davis 2007).11 We add that being able to
reflect on who one is is not something we are all immediately able to do but a
capability people have reason to value.
We see this ‘personal identity capability’ as a meta-capability for selfgovernance that is an aspect of individuals’ agency freedom. Agency freedom in
general concerns a person’s ability to choose in light of their values, i.e., to
weigh well-being functionings against their other values and commitments in
their decisions, while autonomy or self-governance focuses on the more specific
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ability to plan their lives, i.e., to determine which kinds of life they have most
reason to value. Personal identity capability is thus concerned not directly with
having and acting on values and objectives of one’s own, but with one’s
conception of oneself over time. Only in this case does the person reflexively
conceive of herself as a whole—and exercise agency freedom with respect to
her personal identity.
It is important to stress that our drawing on Crocker’s and Sen’s views of
self-determination and self-scrutiny as something people engage in more or
less successfully – but not continuously - makes our personal identity capability
a very anti-essentialist concept quite different from much traditional ‘folkpsychological’ reasoning about personal identity.12 Moreover, that people can be
more or less successful in exercising agency freedom in this regard means that
one can talk about measuring this meta-capability. Indeed there exists a large
literature on the nature and requirements of successful self-narratives (e.g.,
Schechtman 1996; Davis 2011)—which we do not have space to explore
properly here.
Self-narratives are ‘autobiographies with co-authors’ or accounts people give
of their past, present lives, and planned futures that can draw on how others
help us think about ourselves. A child in a poor village who is supported by
others in wanting to go to school, has an account of her life assisted by coauthors that comprehends the various opportunities she wishes she could have.
As she develops in her self-understanding as a person, as well as in terms of
her relationships to others, her account of herself and her co-authors both
change. Her personal autonomy can be understood in terms of her metacapability for reflecting upon and choosing between the kinds of lives she has
reason to value. In this respect, her life in her community is in significant
degree self-transforming to the extent that her individual freedom is supported
by social commitment (Sen 1999a, xi).
Translating our concern for personal autonomy into a capability for
maintaining and developing a personal identity clarifies its centrality to the
development context, which, as we have shown, may be neglected despite the
general agreement of human development practitioners and scholars about the
importance of agency. Doing so also allows us to analyse it as we might any
other capability. There are relevant resources, such as access to credible
truthful information, time free from the demands of work and duty (leisure),
and a stable enough environment to permit long-term planning. There is the
heterogeneity of individuals, in terms of their internal and combined capacities
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for practical reasoning, their social environment, powers of intervening in the
world, and so on. Just as with other capabilities, such as the capability for
appearing in public without shame, being capable of managing one’s capability
set over time is not a yes or no issue, but can be met to one degree or another.
Capability analysis can be employed in the usual way: to identify inadequacies,
diagnose their specific causes, and recommend how they might be ameliorated.
For example, to show that those concerned have not understood what a
development project is about; to determine that this is because the information
they were given was in the wrong language; and to recommend remedying that.
In addition, however, to Crocker and Sen’s emphasis on self-determination
and critical scrutiny of one’s values and objectives, there is another reason to
recognize a personal identity meta-capability that lies at the heart of this paper.
In the capability approach, people are represented as collections of capabilities.
But how are policy-makers to determine which collections of capabilities people
should be without being paternalistic? Sen’s “agent-oriented” approach and
Crocker’s emphasis on agency freedom combined with the idea of a personal
identity capability tells us that individuals’ conceptions of themselves should
determine which collections of capabilities policy-makers promote. The
challenge is how these self-conceptions are related. We turn to this in the next
two sections in connection with the principle of free prior informed consent
and democratic development. Before doing so, however, let us give just one
example of where a failure to focus on the autonomy aspect of agency limits
policy-makers’ understanding of development.
In Poor Economics Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo discuss the
consumption and saving behaviour of the poor and the puzzle of why the poor
don’t take up opportunities to save for their future. They note that many of the
poor don’t feel a sense of control over their lives, that their choices can ever
add up to a different better future, and suggest, “Perhaps this idea that there is
a future is what makes the difference between the poor and the middle-class”
(Banerjee and Duflo 2011, 229). But this not because the poor lack either
choices or rationality. In fact they face a bewildering number of potentially lifealtering choices every day, which people in the rich world rarely have to trouble
themselves with, from navigating unreliable and untrustworthy health and
education systems to securing safe drinking water (cf Sen 1992, 62–4; Duflo
2012, Lecture 1). Merely surviving deprivation requires rational agency in the
general sense. Rather, the character of their deprivation here concerns the
absence of valuable ‘options’: choices that they are able to relate to achieving a
14

better life. The people surveyed by Banerjee and Duflo appear unable to
systematically link their choices over the alternatives open to them to feasible
pathways to the kinds of lives they want to live. In other words, their capability
to manage and enhance their own capability sets is often distinctly limited, and
this is quite compatible with agency in the general sense, and even with
substantial freedom to make life-altering decisions.
Individuals obviously face great difficulties in making rational choices about
their future. For example they may lack adequate information about the
outcomes of developmental choices which are nevertheless irreversible. That
problem seems most severe when their own values, and thus their frame of
reference, are likely to change over the course of development. In the following
sections we therefore focus more specifically on the requirements for
autonomous intertemporal choice in development. How can we ensure that the
subjects of transformational human development projects are able to exercise
autonomous authorship over their own development?

IV. The Principle of Free Prior Informed Consent
One characteristic of paternalism is that it ignores actual people’s forwardlooking evaluations or treats them strategically, as obstacles to be overcome.
That is inconsistent with the central ethical commitment of the human
development approach, in which development is to be considered not as
something that is done to people, but as something that people are involved in
authoring for themselves.
Genuinely human development must engage with individuals as
autonomous agents in managing their own transformation. An important way
of ensuring this is to institutionalise the principle of ‘free prior informed
consent’ throughout development practice.13 This principle provides a robust
framework that those concerned with planning and carrying out development
programmes can refer to in considering the practical requirements of “agentoriented” development in different kinds of cases. It can clarify what follows
from respecting agency, in terms of a requirement to respect, protect, and
enhance the personal identity capability of those involved to plan their lives in
accordance with their own values. It thus provides safeguards against well
meaning paternalism, by which the values of development agents are, perhaps
inadvertently, substituted for those of the people they are trying to help.
15

Applying the informed consent principle requires that the people concerned
be adequately and truthfully informed in advance of the overall aims of a
project, its benefits and costs to them (and the degree of uncertainty about
these), and are free to say yes or no. In the bioethics literature, in which this
principle has been most thoroughly analysed and debated, it has been justified
by a number of distinct though overlapping moral concerns, including
protection of well-being; autonomy (the most prominent); prevention of abusive
conduct; trust; self-ownership; non-domination; and personal integrity (Eyal
2011, sec. 2). Each of these justifications emphasises a distinct moral concern
about the issues and relationships involved. For example, the justification in
terms of trust points to the long term requirements of persuading people to
take part in the kind of relationship which such treatment/research requires.
The justification in terms of preventing abusive conduct is concerned with how
the simple obstacle of gaining informed consent can support the effectiveness
of codes of conduct in governing the behaviour of doctors and researchers.
Each of these moral concerns, or close analogues, is also of potential
relevance to the ethical conduct of development, though different kinds of
situations will likely call for emphasising different moral concerns. For
example, in many cases the beneficent intentions of development agents may
be more questionable than in the Oxfam literacy project, and informed consent
might then be particularly important as a tool to prevent abusive conduct.
Indeed, the informed consent principle has thus far been most clearly
formulated and institutionalized in the development context with respect to
protecting indigenous peoples from exploitation in the name of development. 14
Yet we believe that a genuinely human development policy requires more than
good intentions. It also requires respecting, protecting, supporting and
restoring the personal autonomy of the individuals concerned. It seems to us
that the wider institutionalisation of the informed consent principle in
development practice can play a role in bringing this about. Understanding
personal autonomy in capability terms can help to clarify its requirements.
As we have noted, focusing on personal autonomy rather than agency in
general brings out the importance of factors other than holding values and
choosing freely, such as the role of information. Free prior consent is
insufficient for meeting the requirements of personal autonomy, because, while
it guarantees a choice between alternatives, without adequately informing
people about those alternatives it fails to provide them with options that they
can relate to their ideas of a better life. They may be provided with a selection
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of different levers to pull, but yet be unable to systematically link their choice
of levers to plans for their future. Thus, the disrespect for autonomy involved
in inadequately informing recruits to the Oxfam literacy project is that it
undermined the women’s capability to govern their own lives. They were given
a choice of levers and tried to use the opportunity to pursue the option of
getting a paid job. But it turned out that the lever wasn’t connected to that
option after all.
We are concerned in capability analysis not only with the resources that
people have access to and their characteristics, but also the relation in which
individuals stand to these (their ‘personal utilization function’). Understanding
personal autonomy in terms of a personal identity capability allows the multidimensional character of its determinants to be scrutinised. The principle of
free prior informed consent can thus be understood as prescribing a threshold
for what counts as adequate capability to manage one’s own life with respect to
the project at issue. Where that capability appears insufficient, the informed
consent principle requires us to analyse why this is so and what can be done
about it. We should ask not only whether the information people are given is
adequate (truthful, relevant, and including caveats), but whether they have been
adequately informed (understanding). We should ask not only whether people
have choices, but whether these constitute valuable options that they can
exercise to improve their lives.
Sometimes it might seem that informing people about the consequences of
their decisions is impossible and that the duty of the development agent is
rather to get them to make the right decision. Even if those running a literacy
programme know the likely outcome—empowered women who value their
transformation—it might seem obvious that potential recruits would be
incompetent to comprehend or properly evaluate that outcome in advance (cf
Alkire 2005, 295–6). But it is not so obvious to us. All over the world people
living in poverty exercise their autonomy to embark on dramatic personal
transformations, such as those involved in marriage, parenthood, religious
conversion, or moving from the countryside to a big city or foreign country.
What justifies the presumption that they are incompetent to make their own
decisions about development projects?
It is already established practice, as part of the requirement to adequately
inform, for members of indigenous peoples to visit completed dams and mines
of a similar scale to those proposed for their area and talk to those affected by
them, in order to help them think through how similar projects would change
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their own lives (Goodland 2004, 68). Likewise, prospective students can meet
graduates to see for themselves how literacy does and doesn’t transform lives.
In such ways, the kind of engagement required by seeking informed consent
can also challenge so called ‘adaptive preferences’ by bringing them to the
subjects’ attention and self-scrutiny. Since the phenomenon of adaptation
results, on Sen’s account, from individuals’ abnegation of agency freedom in
order to cope with, or merely survive, circumstances of poverty and oppression
(Sen 1988, 45–6; Qizilbash 2009, §2) it seems to us particularly important to
engage with such people in a way that enhances their capability for reasoning
and self-scrutiny, rather than to second guess what kind of life they should
value.15
The significance of the informed consent principle here is to require
development agents to recognise their positive moral responsibility to ensure
that their clients are adequately informed as well as adequately empowered to
make an autonomous decision about their development. Supporting as well as
respecting the autonomy of the subjects of development requires astute
judgement by development agents that cannot be straightforwardly codified.
Embedding the principle of informed consent in the practice of development is
not meant to make this any easier. Rather, as in bioethics where it originates, it
takes the form of an explicit ethical commitment to meet this challenge. Its
contribution is to bridge the gap between the theoretical understanding of the
self-authorship requirements of genuine human development and the goals and
design of development best-practice by spurring and directing ethical selfscrutiny.
Our analysis so far has focused on the relationship between individuals and
development programmes, and the procedural requirements that follow from
that for legitimate human development. Yet it is of course the case that most
transformational development programmes take place at the social not the
individual scale. In the next section we therefore turn to considering the
requirements for respecting autonomy at this more complex group level, in
terms of ‘democratic development’.

V. Democratic Development
The human development approach takes a specifically democratic perspective
to development theory and practice that rests on a central distinction between
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the means and ends of the life one has reason to value (e.g. Sen 1999a). The
ends of development are the beings and doings that people have reason to
value, and are identified through an exercise of public deliberation and social
choice by all those concerned (cf. Crocker 2009, chap. 9–10). The means of
development are those things (such as capital, commodities, institutions, laws,
public services, and so on) that are necessary for bringing about the kind of life
people have reason to value. They are provided by those agencies (such as
government ministries and development NGOs) which possess technical
knowledge and command over the causal factors of development. These
development agencies may provide advice and even ethical arguments, for
instance in the form of critical perspectives on gender justice, or factual
information about the feasibility of different policy proposals. But their
evaluations do not determine what the ends of development are, i.e. what
people in this community have reason to value.
This division of labour between the valuation exercise and its technocratic
implementation—values and facts—contrasts with the standard development
paradigm in which development agencies assume responsibility for the goals,
conception, design, implementation and evaluation of development policies.
The democratic perspective taken by the human development approach puts
the policy exercise in service to the valuation exercise so that collective
deliberation over the ends of development, often very local, substitutes for
their technocratic determination. As Sen puts it,
The people have to be seen, in this perspective, as being actively involved—
given the opportunity—in shaping their own destiny, and not just as passive
recipients of the fruits of cunning development programs. The state and the
society have extensive roles in strengthening and safeguarding human
capabilities. This is a supporting role, rather than one of ready-made
delivery. (Sen 1999a, 53)
Democratic development requires that those involved be able to influence
the outcome both through participation in a community’s deliberations and
through having their final decisions counted equally with those of others if a
vote is necessary. Of course individuals will not always get their own way or be
entirely satisfied about their community’s developmental priorities. The value
of democracy understood as collective self-determination does not consist in
providing each individual, or even each sub-group, with control or ‘veto’ rights
over such decisions, but in the extent to which its procedures respect and
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enhance every individual’s capability to be engaged in the authorship of
decisions that will transform their lives.
The involvement of individuals in a forward-looking democratic process of
public deliberation over social goals is qualitatively different from cases where
either policy-makers decide those goals directly or it is decided by one-off
voting (mere aggregative social choice). This is because such public deliberation
directly engages people as autonomous agents in the collective selfdetermination of their values and concerns. Such exercises work through, not
over, the personal identity capability of individuals since they presuppose that
agents reflect upon the consequences of the options open to them, for
themselves as well as for society, in making their contributions to the
participatory process. Thus development pursued in this democratic manner is
not paternalistic, even if outside development agencies assist in setting up its
institutions. Rather, by making the individuals themselves the (co)authors of
change in their lives rather than groups of external experts, democratic
development is a necessary component of transformation without paternalism.
It is important to note the feasibility of integrating what may seem an
abstract ideal into development projects, as demonstrated for example by the
Indian development NGO Gram Vikas. Gram Vikas approaches villages with the
offer of financial and technical support in building water and sanitation
systems. But it won’t proceed without the commitment and engagement of the
whole community. That requires the formation of a village general assembly
including all adults that discusses over a period of many months the NGO’s
proposals and their long-term implementation by the villagers themselves
before deciding whether to sign a contract between the village and the NGO.
Several hundred villages covering over 150,000 people have signed on to the
programme in this way so far.16
Our analysis of the demands of a truly “agent-oriented” development
provides a powerful supplementary argument for the constitutive importance
of democratic deliberation in human development policy. Of course it is well
recognized among proponents of the capability approach that democracy and
political freedoms are intrinsically valuable dimensions of development in
general, but this is not always extended to development projects in particular.
For example, local participation is often promoted in terms of respecting
agency in general as a goal, while we have argued that democratic participation
should also be seen as respecting personal autonomy in particular as a side20

constraint, a requirement for these projects to be understood as human
development rather than as something else.
In addition to being required for the conceptual coherence of the human
development approach, public reasoning and deliberation also have a positive
instrumental relationship with the personal identity capability we have
identified, since they provide important opportunities for its exercise and
development. They give people real options to choose between, and the ‘leisure’
(information, space, freedom, and other minds) to consider them properly. That
experience is likely to enhance individuals’ personal identity capability in their
private lives to reflect upon and deliberate about who they want to become and
how to get there. To the extent that individuals reflect upon and change their
own values or group affiliations through participation in public reasoning - for
example coming to see certain social norms concerning women’s fertility as
invidious (Sen 1995, 17) - they exercise their personal identity capability for
determining their own values and what follows from them. Sen has argued for
the constructive value of public reasoning and deliberation. From the
perspective of the individual they might also be seen as transformational.
VI. Conclusion
This paper aimed to elucidate and address the ethical concerns underlying the
idea of development as transformation. We began the paper by noting that
while conventional ‘capacity building’ approaches to development evade the
concerns this raises, the human development approach cannot. Human
development not only aims directly at the transformation of people’s lives, but
it also claims to be an “agent-oriented” view. We believe this implies specific
goals and constraints for the practice of development which have not so far
been explicitly recognised.
In working these out, we noted that the human development perspective
assumes that an individual’s values evolve with development. We introduced
the concept of a personal identity capability to represent the understanding of
personal autonomy this implied: the ability to change one’s life, including one’s
ideas about the kind of life one has reason to value, and yet remain the same
person. In doing so we clarified the requirements of taking an “agent-oriented”
view in the context of value transformation. One can only evaluate whether
people are better or worse off, rather than merely changed, if they themselves
provide evaluative continuity in the form of auto-biographical accounts of
themselves relating their paths chosen to their reasons for them.
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We then showed that this analysis of personal identity has important
implications for development practice. Analysis in terms of personal identity
capability can be helpful in identifying and diagnosing ethical problems in the
practice of human development which standard comparative static methods,
such as before and after capability-set evaluations, would miss. In consequence,
we argued that human development policy should incorporate procedural
principles that protect and promote the capability of those concerned to be the
authors of their own development: the principles of free prior informed
consent and democratic development.
The capability approach is generally understood as being founded on
respect for individual freedom and agency. What we believe to be less well
recognized is that it also implicitly relies on a conception of people as evolving
and able to reflect upon their personal identities and individual development.
This paper has sought to make explicit the theoretical and practical
implications of this conception of the person.
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Endnotes
This paper is concerned with the conceptual and practical implications of one specific concept
of development - the Human Development Approach promoted by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) and based on Amartya Sen’s capability approach. We do not
seek to comment on the broader range of practises sometimes termed development but which
fall outside this definition, such as the displacement of communities for economic development
projects like dam and road-building (cf. Penz, Drydyk, and Bose 2011). Such practises certainly
require ethical scrutiny, but the central concern would seem to be inter-personal relations (i.e.
justice), not the intra-personal relations that we focus on here (i.e. autonomy).
2
Sen has made this point elsewhere - in discussing the discipline of cost-benefit analysis - “It is
important to distinguish between genuine changes in values and those that reflect alterations
of relative weights because of parametric variations of the determining variables” (Sen 2000b,
945).
3
Where public officials extort bribes for performing their mandated duties (such as taking
crime reports, issuing identity documents, and the like), the people who pay do so unwillingly.
1
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This reform gives them an asymmetric legal power to denounce officials after getting what they
need. The knowledge of this would significantly change officials’ subjective expected utility
calculations about demanding bribes. As a result, this type of corrupt behaviour may decline.
4
This point was noted in the first UN Human Development Report: “The basic needs approach
usually concentrates on the bundle of goods and services that deprived population groups
need: food, shelter, clothing, health care and water. It focuses on the provision of these goods
and services rather than on the issue of human choices” (UNDP 1990, 11). For other critical
comparisons of the Basic Needs Approach with respect to the capability approach, see for
example (Sen 1984, 513–515; Alkire 2005, 166–177; Stewart 2007).
5
The latter is the utility function - ‘Homo economicus’ - view of neo-classical economics in
which an individual is represented as having a given set of preferences that are specifically
‘their own’. For a critique of the circularity of this account in terms of personal identity over
time, see Davis (2003; 2011, chap. 1).
6
We do not believe this emphasis on (self) transformation renders our view of the human
development approach unacceptably ‘athletic’ in terms of requiring an unfeasibly high level of
continuous active agency, as G.A. Cohen once accused Sen (Cohen 1993; Sen 1993; Pettit 2001).
Transformation is a simply a fact about development, including conventional development
policies. Our concern here is with the capability of individuals to exercise control over their
transformation, and with integrating this explicitly as both a goal and a side-constraint in the
theory and practice of human development. Autonomous transformation no more requires
continuous self-reflection than literacy requires that one always be reading.
7
Of course, for many evaluative purposes specific lists may be used, for example concerning a
threshold for what is generally agreed to be severe poverty (Alkire and Santos 2010), or to focus
on a particular issue like gender inequality (Robeyns 2003). Nevertheless the foundational
concern of the capability approach is with individuals’ capability to live the lives they have
reason to value.
8
Note that incorporating the evaluation of process into consequentialist analysis is a longtime
concern of Sen’s (Thompson 2010; Sen 2000a). Recent work on children and the capability
approach has brought a new focus to issues of becoming, and the respect for procedural as well
as opportunity aspects of freedom that this requires (e.g. Biggeri, Ballet, and Comim 2011)
9
One further justification for the structure of the project could be that if enough women in the
local area were to become literate, supply would create its own demand: social norms would
change and job opportunities would appear (Alkire 2005, 280). But this still means using the
present students as a means to an end in some sense, and in any case the scale of the increase
in women’s literacy that would require is far beyond the capacities of that NGO project.
10
This can be generalized further. Neglecting how people’s value transformations come about –
for example, whether they are ‘brought about’ by others – would seem to leave development
programmes open to the same general critique of adaptive preferences on which the capability
approach is itself (partly) founded.
11
Here Sen goes beyond Thomas Schelling’s conception of multiple selves (Schelling 1978,
1984). Schelling cannot say how individuals organize their different selves because each self is
merely a utility function, and as such none can engage in reflection and reasoned self-scrutiny.
12
We share Derek Parfit’s dissatisfaction with the mis-use of such common-sense conceptions
of personal identity (Parfit 1995).
13
Although most systematically developed in the area of bioethics (with respect to medical
treatment and research involving human subjects) the application of the informed consent
principle is not limited to dealings between institutions and individuals, but has also recently
been extended and adapted to cases where large numbers of people are involved, such as the
reform of health systems (Daniels 2006); economic policy making (DeMartino 2011; Blomfield
2012); and conventional economic development programmes (cf Goodland 2004; Penz, Drydyk,
and Bose 2011). In such cases it is the self-determination of a community, rather than the
autonomy of an individual, that is at stake and legitimate decision-making processes will vary
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from the bioethics case (for example through public deliberation and social choice).We consider
such extensions below, under ‘democratic development’.
14
It is recognised that indigenous peoples are particularly vulnerable to coercive exploitation of
their lands and resources, even when that goes against national laws and official policies,
because of their degree of political and social exclusion in many countries. The relative
simplicity of informed consent requirements (for example as a requirement by the World Bank
for supporting projects) may protect such marginalised groups from abusive conduct in a way
that more complex, under-enforced, or politicised national laws may not (cf Goodland 2004).
15
The issue of adaptation is a complex and contested one within the human development
literature (Nussbaum 2000, chap. 2; Khader 2011; see also Wells 2013, chapter 4). Of particular
significance is the scope this concept can allow for well-meaning paternalism by development
agencies (David Clark, 2009, explains this problem with particular vigour), when deprived
people are seen to lack the capacity – not merely the capability - to make decisions for
themselves and therefore cede the right to do so. Note that adaptation may be even more
effectively addressed by engagement in the collective deliberation required by ‘democratic
development’.
16
Lack of space prevents us from discussing this fascinating case study of democratic
development further (but see Keirns 2008).
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